The ledger: append-only, hash-chained, independently verifiable
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The ledger records vouchers (bilag) with double-entry lines. It is designed so that history cannot change without detection — the property bokføringsloven’s sporbarhet requirements ask for, and the product’s core trust story (“don’t trust us — verify”).
Invariants
Section titled “Invariants”- Double entry: every voucher has ≥ 2 lines summing to exactly 0 øre.
- Gap-free numbering: voucher numbers per journal + fiscal year have no gaps, even across failed/rolled-back postings.
- Append-only: posted vouchers and lines are never updated or
deleted. Corrections are new reversing vouchers
(
reverses_voucher_id). - Tamper-evidence: every voucher is hash-chained; rewriting any historical voucher breaks the chain from that point on.
The three enforcement layers
Section titled “The three enforcement layers”| Layer | Mechanism | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | VoucherDraft::validate rejects unbalanced/degenerate vouchers before any I/O |
crates/regnmed-core/src/voucher.rs |
| Database | Deferred constraint trigger re-checks balance at COMMIT; append-only triggers reject UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE on voucher/entry; the app role (regnmed_app) is only GRANTed INSERT/SELECT on ledger tables |
crates/regnmed-db/migrations/0002…0004 |
| Crypto | hash = SHA-256(prev_hash ‖ canonical(voucher)), chained from a genesis hash per company |
crates/regnmed-core/src/hash.rs |
The layers are independent: an attacker must defeat all three, and the crypto layer is verifiable by parties who don’t trust the database at all.
The hash chain, precisely
Section titled “The hash chain, precisely”- Canonical serialization: every field of the voucher (company, sequence,
journal, year, number, date, description, reversal reference, creator,
timestamp, and every line) is length-prefixed as a netstring
(
<len>:<bytes>;), so no field content can masquerade as another field. Entry count is included, so lines cannot be appended silently. - Timestamps are truncated to microseconds before hashing and before
storage, because Postgres
timestamptzstores microseconds — the stored row must re-hash identically forever. - The serialization is frozen per format version, and every voucher
stores which version hashed it (
hash_version). v1 is the original; v2 (introduced with reskontro) adds a version marker and the entry’s party number, so reassigning a receivable between customers is tamper-evident too; v3 (introduced with dimensjoner, docs/dimensjoner.md) adds each entry’s avdeling and prosjekt codes, so moving a cost between prosjekter is tamper-evident too; v4 (introduced with flervaluta, docs/valuta.md) adds each entry’s valutainformasjon (ISO code, valutabeløp, bokført kurs), so rewriting what a transaction lød på or the rate it was booked at is tamper-evident too. Golden tests pin one digest per version (golden_hashes_never_change); if any fails, the change would break verification of deployed ledgers — a format is never edited, only superseded. Mixed-version chains verify from genesis. - Posting locks the company’s
chain_headrow FOR UPDATE, which serializes postings per company — required by both the chain and gap-free numbering. The chain head is a mutable pointer, not history; verification recomputes the chain from the vouchers and only compares the result against it.
Verification
Section titled “Verification”regnmed verify-ledger re-walks every company’s chain from genesis:
recomputes each voucher’s hash from stored business content, checks the
link to the previous hash, and finally compares against the chain head.
Any edited amount, description, date or deleted voucher is reported with
its sequence number.
Trust model (vs. blockchain)
Section titled “Trust model (vs. blockchain)”Structurally this is a blockchain-style hash chain (git history and Certificate Transparency are the close relatives). Bitcoin’s immutability comes from decentralized consensus + proof-of-work; ours cannot, because there is one writer. Instead:
- Everyone below full-database control is stopped by the database layer.
- An adversary with full DB control could rewrite the entire chain and
recompute all hashes — which is why chain heads are anchored
externally: every company’s head becomes a leaf of a Merkle tree
whose single root is published outside the database (public
/anchorsendpoint, RFC 3161 timestamp tokens). Once a root exists outside the adversary’s control, a rewrite of anchored history is provable, not just suspectable. Design, formats and verification procedure: anchoring.md. - The revisor running
verify-ledgeragainst an anchored head plays the role consensus plays in Bitcoin — third-party verifiability without the energy cost, which is the right trade-off for accounting.
Where it is tested
Section titled “Where it is tested”crates/regnmed-core/src/hash.rs— determinism, tamper sensitivity, golden digest, netstring boundary collisions, timestamp stability.crates/regnmed-db/tests/ledger.rs(against real Postgres, also in CI): gap-free numbers across failed postings; UPDATE/DELETE rejected; hand-inserted unbalanced voucher rejected at COMMIT; a simulated DBA-level adversary (triggers disabled viasession_replication_role) detected byverify_chain, and clean verification after repair.